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Abstract 
Should humans interfere in the lives of elephants? 
Culling seems to be a cruel method of human interference in 
the lives of elephants. Culling is generally used to control 
population numbers of highly developed mammals to protect 
vegetation and habitat for other species. Many people are 
against human interference in the lives of elephants. In this 
article aspects of this highly controversial issue are explored. 
Three fascinating characteristics of this ethical dilemma are 
discussed in the introductory part, and then the major 
arguments raised against human interference in the lives of 
elephants are evaluated. These arguments are the following: 
First, that nature should be allowed to run its course and 
establish its own balance; nature will thus solve the problem of 
elephant over-population. The second argument raised by 
animal-rights activists as well as by animal-welfare groups 
either claim that animals have rights that humans must respect 
at all times, or that all sentient beings have interests that 
humans ought to respect, as those beings can experience 
pleasure or pain. The third argument often associates culling 
elephants as method for population control with the commercial 
use and exploitation of wilderness areas. Many people argue 
that it is unethical to use wildlife as a sustainable resource for 
fighting poverty. In conclusion it is stated that despite these 
arguments human intervention in the lives of elephants is 
ethically justified.  
Opsomming 
Behoort die mens in te meng in die lewens van olifante? 
Die uitdunning van olifante lyk na ’n wrede manier waarop die 
mens inmeng in die lewens van olifante. Die metode van 
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uitdunning word gebruik om die bevolkingsgetalle van hoogs 
ontwikkelde soogdiere te beheer om sodoende die plantegroei 
en habitat vir ander spesies te bewaar. Baie mense is daarteen 
gekant dat die mens inmeng in olifante se lewens. Aspekte van 
hierdie hoogs omstrede kwessie word in hierdie artikel 
ondersoek. Drie fassinerende kenmerke van hierdie etiese 
dilemma word bespreek en daarna word die belangrikste 
argumente teen menslike inmenging in die bestaan van olifante 
geëvalueer. Hierdie drie argumente is die volgende: Eerstens, 
dat die natuur sy eie gang moet gaan om daardeur self ’n 
balans te bewerkstellig; die natuur sal dus self die oorbevolking 
van olifante regstel. Die tweede argument wat deur diereregte- 
en dierewelsynsgroepe aangevoer word, eis óf dat diere regte 
het wat te alle tye deur mense gerespekteer moet word, óf dat 
diere met waarnemingsvermoë belange het wat mense moet 
respekteer, omdat hierdie lewende wesens genot en pyn kan 
ervaar. Die derde argument assosieer die uitdunning van 
olifantgetalle as ’n metode van getallebeheer met die 
kommersiële benutting en uitbuiting van wildernisgebiede. Baie 
mense is oortuig dit is oneties om wilde diere as volhoubare 
bron te benut om armoede mee te beveg. Die slotsom waartoe 
gekom word is dat ten spyte van hierdie argumente menslike 
inmenging in die lewens van olifante tog eties geregverdig is. 
1. Introduction1
To substantiate different aspects of the argument about the issue of 
managing elephant numbers and the pros and cons of human 
intervention in the lives of elephants, several relevant situations,2 
structured and formulated as narrated stories will be incorporated 
into the line of argumentation. These stories are imaginative 
                                      
1 Earlier versions of this article were presented at different places: (i) the annual 
conference of the Southern African Philosophical Association (Pietermaritzburg 
in January 2004), (ii) The Great Elephant Indaba organised by the Wildlife and 
Environmental Society of South Africa (Nelspruit in August 2004), (iii) a 
teleconference organised by the Transboundary Protected Areas Research 
Initiative (March 2004) and (iv) the Departments of Philosophy (February 2004) 
and Zoology (April 2004) at the University of Johannesburg. I would like to thank 
the following people for their discussions and debates with me on elephant 
issues, as well as for enabling me to observe elephant behaviour, impacts, and 
habitats: Michelle Henley, Steve Henley, Ian Whyte, Audrey Delsink, Douw 
Grobler, David Mabunda, Josias Chabani, Howard Blight, Norman Owen-Smith, 
Johan du Toit, Lucas Rutina, Frederick M. Dipotso, and Elizabeth Masuku. Marc 
Basson improved my use of the English language. 
2 Specific narratives substantiating the main argument will be formatted in italics 
and presented without quotation marks.  
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fictionalisations that are loosely based on facts, though pre-
dominantly reflecting my (HPPL’s) interpretations of such facts. 
Certain excerpts from already published observations of other 
people are also enclosed as quotations substantiating a specific 
aspect of the argument. This method of including narratives is also 
applied to depict real-world situations and thus lending the problem 
and issue to be investigated directness of appeal. Summing up: 
These narrations emphasise that decisions about the management 
of elephants affect many areas: the lives of human beings, other 
animal species, ecological and biodiversity systems as well as the 
opinions of concerned supporters of conservation areas. 
At the outset of the article the diverse problems and frustrations 
experienced by of three people from different walks of life, and living 
in different parts of the world are depicted. Each of these people are 
directly or indirectly involved in the concomitant problems of an 
elephant population that has grown out of proportion: An official also 
acting as wildlife manager in the Kruger National Park ponders how 
the issue about elephants numbers should be addressed. A 
Botswana inhabitant whose crops are ruined by elephants wonders 
how he and his family will survive without income. An overseas 
activist who wants to conserve wild life at all costs takes the war 
path. In this respect these narratives relating to the position of 
elephants are rooted in everyday life situations and thus efficiently 
illustrate the variety of problems to be discussed in this article. 
In Skukuza, the administrative headquarters of the 
magnificent 19 000 square kilometer Kruger National 
Park (KNP) in north eastern South Africa, Ian Whyte sits in 
his office, pondering the information about the park’s 
elephant population. The KNP’s successful conservation 
strategies have re-established elephants in this vast area 
where they were hunted almost to extinction in the 19th 
century. From only a few tracks in the sand in 1903 the 
population has grown to 11 671 in 2003, unfortunately 
much more than the park’s scientists believe its vegetation 
can support. The destructive feeding habits of these 
wonderful animals that Ian loves so much can change the 
woodland vegetation of the park into grassland, thus 
endangering the continued existence of many plant, bird, 
reptile, insect, amphibian, and mammal species. Ian thus 
ponders how he should advise the KNP management. 
Should the KNP start a culling programme again, as they 
did efficiently to keep elephant numbers in check from 
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1967 to 1994? Does a loss of other species and major 
change in landscape warrant destroying family herds? Are 
these good enough reasons to kill specimens of the world’s 
largest mammal instantaneously by means of a gunshot in 
the brain, fired by a game warden from a helicopter? Would 
the elephants being killed communicate their fear and 
distress by using their infrasound communication – sounds 
that we humans cannot hear – to alert other herds up to ten 
kilometers away? Will local and international individuals 
and NGO activists once again respond by court interdicts 
and boycotts to pressurise the KNP to stop their culling 
programme, as they did in 1995?  
In Mahawe in northern Botswana, Sipho Morake is 
furious. Last night the elephants raided his crops again. He 
and his sons tried to chase them away with fires and the 
sound of drums, but the elephants have become used to 
these scare tactics. Instead of running away, they charged 
and almost killed one of his sons. Fortunately no one was 
hurt, so at least they were not as unlucky as their 
neighbour, whose nephew was killed by an elephant two 
weeks ago. Sipho does not know how his family will survive 
the next winter. Almost half his crops has been destroyed 
thus far this year and the government does not pay any 
compensation for losses caused by elephants. He will have 
to find a better way to deal with these problem elephants. 
Perhaps he could try digging deep holes for the elephants 
to fall into and then kill them – this method his grandfather 
said worked quite well for their ancestors. Maybe he should 
try to get a rich hunter who could even pay him to shoot the 
problem animals. This option, however, could be risky, as 
the government has banned the hunting of animals several 
years ago. If only he could get rid of these damn elephants 
that disrupt his life, impoverish his already poor family, and 
even kill members of his community! He cannot understand 
why the government does not exterminate them and give 
the land to his people for farming purposes. 
In London, Jason Smith is on his way to a very important 
meeting of his favourite organisation, Born Free. Tonight 
they are going to plan a strategy to force the national parks 
in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Botswana not to even 
consider culling programmes in the near future. He is 
excited and angry. His excitement was sparked by the 
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recent successes in the conservation of elephants after the 
disastrous crash in their numbers caused by the cruel and 
wasteful poaching slaughter of elephants for their ivory in 
the 1980s.3 After CITES had banned trade in ivory in 1989, 
the killings have sharply diminished. Elephants have found 
respite from human persecution and extirpation in many 
parts of Africa and Asia. There is no way that Jason and 
his fellow activists will allow these gains to be undone by 
the ruthless killing of elephants by the very people 
supposed to be custodians of African wildlife! The idea of 
game rangers shooting defenseless elephants from the 
safety of a helicopter ignites his anger. The procedure of 
wiping out an entire herd, starting with the matriarch and 
then the older cows so as to disorient the others, and thus 
preventing their escape, is cruel and unbefitting of such 
awe-inspiring creatures. No, Jason says to himself, we will 
not allow this. We will teach these Third World 
conservationists in the south to respect the rights of every 
individual animal in their care – even if it requires us to 
organise an international tourist boycott of those 
conservation areas and to advocate a ban of all their 
exports to First World countries. Such a campaign would 
be exciting. At tonight’s meeting Leonardo DiCaprio, the 
film idol, will be present to discuss his role to launch the 
campaign and draw in funds. Let the struggle continue! 
Elephants have excited human interest and elicited human 
fascination ever since the first contact between the two species 
thousands of years ago. Elephants’ mammoth size as the largest 
land animal, their intelligence and renowned memory, and their 
gentle social nature have drawn appreciation and wonder from 
humans in different cultures throughout history. Nonetheless, their 
economic value as trainable servants in Asia and bearers of ivory in 
Africa has almost led to their extinction in the 20th century. As one 
of the world’s charismatic mega-fauna, elephants attract human 
attention and their fate concerns lots of people everywhere (see 
Ginsberg, 2002:1190).  
For these reasons, the management of elephants anywhere on the 
planet is an international issue. The methods which conservationists 
suggest and wildlife managers implement to deal with local issues of 
                                      
3 For more information see Ginsberg (2002:1188). 
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habitat destruction supposedly caused by elephants, and the 
resultant loss of species in conservation areas, are scrutinised and 
carefully evaluated by interested parties all over the world. How 
governments deal with wildlife that causes crop losses and loss of 
life in rural Africa is monitored and judged by concerned 
environmentalists around the globe. And rightly so. These issues 
might not affect the survival of living beings on earth to the same 
extent as pollution, deforestation, and global warming. However, the 
conservation of the diversity of life forms to prevent their extinction 
at human hands is surely a legitimate way of preserving a heritage 
humans have been bequeathed by millions of years of evolution, 
growth, and development of life on earth.  
Culling excess animals in conservation areas is a highly 
controversial and emotional issue wherever it occurs (Hanks, 
1979:43; Whyte, 2002:293). Somehow killing animals seems heavily 
at odds with the conservation bodies’ mandate to protect animal and 
plant species. Conservationists must protect them because we 
humans have endangered non-human living beings through our 
continuously expanding presence in almost all areas on earth and 
our domination and exploitation of natural resources.  
Culling seems to be a cruel method of human interference in the 
lives of elephants. It aims to control population numbers of highly 
developed mammals just to protect vegetation and habitat for other 
less important species – culling seems to be a method that ought 
not to be allowed (Sukumar, 2003:224). More importantly, many 
people are against any human interference in the lives of elephants. 
Is the issue, however, that simple? In this article I want to explore 
aspects of this highly controversial and emotive issue, the so-called 
“elephant problem”. I will first discuss three fascinating character-
istics of this ethical dilemma and then discuss the major arguments 
raised against human interference in the lives of elephants. This 
discussion leads to a conclusion that strong arguments can be made 
to justify human intervention in ecological processes in conservation 
areas. 
The ethical issue of whether humans should interfere with elephant 
numbers raises a host of different questions. This ethical dilemma 
has three particular characteristics that make it a fascinating 
challenge to resolve. These characteristics are the following: the 
complex and intertwining set of issues engendered by this matter; 
the urgency of making a decision concerning a matter that has 
consequences that become more complicated whilst making up 
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one’s mind; and the complex role of science and emotions in the 
process of decision making. 
1.1 Interfering with elephants: a complex set of intersecting 
issues 
To make a responsible decision about human interference with 
elephant numbers, one has to be open to the diversity of questions 
generated by this issue. Being open leads to the discovery of a set 
of complex intersecting issues such as the following:  
• The conservation of individual animals intersects with the 
conservation of species, habitat, ecosystems, and biodiversity.  
• The safety and security of humans and the integrity of their 
property intersects with the protection of free-roaming animals.  
• Human poverty in environments not suited for farming intersects 
with the utilisation of those environments’ rich natural plant and 
animal (wildlife) resources. Such utilisation has the potential of 
improving the life of thousands of people in ways consistent with 
their cultural traditions that have been developed and nurtured 
over hundreds of years. 
Further questions raised by the control of elephant numbers include 
the following: What are the relations humans ought to have with 
other animals? What are the goals of nature conservation? How do 
we judge human overpopulation and our destruction of the 
environment that strongly affects other living beings? To what extent 
can humans accommodate the interests of animals when these 
interests are in conflict with ours? Does sustainable use of natural 
resources include elephants or are they exempt from human 
utilisation? Should the victims of past injustices committed during 
the establishment of conservation areas be compensated, and what 
are the functions and responsibilities of the state in protecting the 
lives and bodies of citizens and safeguarding their property? 
Taking the intertwining nature of the complex of issues generated by 
the control of elephant numbers seriously, emphasises the need for 
a holistic perspective to avoid a restricted vision of one issue only. 
1.2 Making a decision or not – there are consequences 
A second fascinating characteristic makes the ethical issue of 
human interference in the lives of elephants an urgent one. This 
issue cannot be avoided, as the problem has increased over time. A 
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case study will illustrate the point. Since the Kruger National Park in 
north eastern South Africa placed a moratorium on culling in 1995 to 
review their elephant-management policy (Whyte, 2001:2; Whyte et 
al.,1999:111), the number of elephants has increased from the 
previously desired number of between 6 000 and 8 000 elephants to 
11 671 in 2003. Whilst reviewing their policy since 1995, elephants 
have still been increasing by an estimated growth rate of 7% 
annually and they continue feeding in their robust way; thus 
modifying their habitat. Reports of excessive modification, which 
amounted to destruction, were made by a senior manager, and if 
culling were to be resumed, large numbers of elephants might have 
to be culled if judged according to the pre-1995 policy requirements 
(Whyte, 2002:305). 
Refusing to take a decision on the issue of limiting elephant 
numbers thus in fact implies to take sides; it implies a choice to let 
nature be, a preference to let matters develop without any human 
intervention. In this case, and by doing nothing, wildlife managers 
are actually making a choice for which they ought to be held 
accountable to the same extent as for any other conscious, 
deliberate choice. Their choice to do nothing is actually a major 
intervention in the short-term interests of all individual elephants. 
This choice, according to some ecologists, violates the interests of 
other animal species, vegetation, and landscapes in the long run. 
There seems to be, then, no neutral ground in conservation areas. 
Whatever choice wildlife managers make in managing elephant 
populations, choices regarding this issue have consequences that 
cannot be ignored in any way, as they are there for everyone to see. 
For this reason a consequentialist ethical approach cannot be 
dismissed. Increased or decreased numbers of elephants, large-
scale destruction of woodlands to turn them into grasslands, or 
limited signs of elephants’ robust feeding habits – decisions about 
the management of elephants affect the lives of thousands of 
animals, plants, all other living species, human visitors, and 
concerned supporters of conservation areas (see Mosugelo et al., 
2002:235, 237, 238; Mapaure & Campbell, 2002:216). To allow 
elephants to increase without intervention has consequences for the 
everyday duties of park rangers who witness and monitor the 
changes – changes that eventually lead to the disappearance of 
habitats and species. It is a definite long-term possibility to observe 
a devastating population crash, as in Tsavo East during the drought 
of 1970-1971, as a result of elephant overpopulation. Similarly, to 
choose culling is to expose some people to killing scenes of 
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magnificent animals, as well as to involve others in removing 
carcasses and processing meat, hides, and ivory in professionally 
managed abattoirs. Unfortunately, at least some wildlife managers 
will then have to deal with the grim logistics of large-scale culling 
operations. In this ethical debate, consequences of decisions play a 
huge role. 
1.3 Science versus emotion 
When debating the issue of limiting the numbers of the elephant 
population the following slogan is often emphasised: Science has 
information, not answers. Emotions have attitudes, not solutions. 
The role of science and emotions provides a third gripping 
characteristic of the controversial ethical issue of managing 
elephants. Science and emotions seemingly stand diametrically 
opposed regarding the issue of limiting elephant numbers, especially 
as regards the practice of culling elephants. The cool, calculating 
gaze of the scientist is supposedly the one to rationally resolve this 
issue, as scientists have access to the hard facts that alone can and 
ought to guide policy recommendations (Gillson & Lindsay, 
2003:411-419). At least, so some scientists believe; these scientists 
try, in typical positivist fashion, to detach their emotions from their 
decision making. The extent to which they fail is shown by the 
diversity of contrasting views scientists have on the issue of culling. 
Scientists familiar with elephant behaviour, conversant with the 
standard literature on elephants, and knowledgeable about the 
history of elephant management in conservation areas, never-
theless, disagree vehemently on whether culling is necessary for the 
health of conservation areas.  
Is human interference not a matter of science: of specialised 
disciplines like ecology or wildlife management? So why judge that 
ethics can resolve this issue? Judging numerous scientific and 
popular scientific publications makes it clear that scientists look at 
the same data and information, yet interpret it differently, and in the 
process reach incompatible conclusions. Where do their differences 
come from? Some of them give priority to one species (elephants) 
above others, while others judge that ecosystems and biospheres 
have priority above individual animals. Some have a conception of 
nature that suggests it functions best when left alone without human 
interference, whilst others wish to aid nature in countering undue 
and undesirable human influences. Thus, scientists use more than 
scientific information when thinking about the acceptability of limiting 
elephant numbers: several value choices influence their stance (see 
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Elliot, 1991:284). Science does not provide the answers for the 
problem of human interference, but merely the information that 
needs to be taken into account in decision making on such policies 
(Owen-Smith, 1988:xi). 
So-called scientific thinkers believe emotions will only cloud and 
distort the issue, resulting in irrational ranting and raving that 
prevents the give and take of rational dialogue (see Irven Buss, 
1990:175; Hanks, 1979:43). Reacting against this one-sided 
scientific approach based on our observations and calculating 
reason, many activists and concerned citizens are guided by their 
deeply felt emotions for elephants. They find it unimaginable to kill 
sociable, gentle, intelligent animals that resemble us in so many 
ways, for what are to them such unconvincing reasons. Rather than 
distorting and blurring the issue, they experience their emotions as 
guides to show the value elephants have for us. Emotions delineate 
the limits of what human beings may do to elephants. However, 
whilst emphasising the value of emotions in this controversial, 
difficult debate, some individuals and groups often base decisions 
one-sidedly on emotions, excluding reason. This narrow reliance on 
emotions leads people to be unwilling participants in dialogue, to 
reject other positions outright, to threaten their adversaries with 
reprisals, and to ignore any form of scientific evidence and 
reasoning. 
And yet, to reject emotions in the debates on limiting elephant 
numbers, and especially on the practice of culling, would be short-
sighted, as emotions are far more valuable than merely clouding 
issues or distorting facts. To look at the facts clinically by rejecting 
any undue influence of emotions is then clearly undesirable. Only 
callous people can say that killing (special) animals is unemotional; 
only insensitive observers can deny that experiencing nature’s rich 
biodiversity is awesome or amazing; only inattentive tourists without 
empathy can observe elephants interacting as families and not be 
moved. Emotions alert us to significant issues, they make us aware 
of what is of value, and require us to rethink the significance of what 
we encounter and observe. Once we have reflected on such issues, 
the consequent emotions can be judged to be rational, as they 
signify the appropriate value we ought to attach to something, 
someone, an event, or action. The enormous emotional sensitivity 
about the accusation that their scientific management practices were 
unethical, stopped culling in the Kruger National Park in 1995. This 
event underlines how scientists and managers of the Kruger 
National Park took emotions seriously and responded to highly 
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emotional accusations that must have resonated somewhere inside 
themselves. Wildlife scientists and managers passionate about 
conserving animals, experience emotions of sadness and regret 
when the animals they conserve or study have to be killed. 
Conclusion 1: 
It is our choice, based on our ethics (moral values), that we 
want to implement as goals for conservation areas and these 
goals eventually end up as guidelines for management 
practices; there is no scientific information or data that forces us 
to make a definite choice one way or the other (see Whyte, 
2001:154; Owen-Smith, 1988:298; Leuthold, 1996:101-112). 
Emotions about conservation issues must be critically 
interrogated to become meaningful guides to action in 
conjunction with reason and ethics. 
2. Arguments against human interference in the lives of 
elephants  
2.1 “Leave nature alone; do not interfere”  
One of the strongest arguments against human interference in the 
lives of elephants is based on the idea that nature should be allowed 
to run its course and establish a balance that changes over time. 
This idea rests on firm scientific evidence from many disciplines, 
especially ecology itself. For a long time ecologists supported the 
so-called equilibrium paradigm, which implies that nature itself 
establishes a delicate harmony and balance between various life 
forms that humans can easily upset. Thus, they concluded, humans 
should not interfere. Nowadays, however, the disequilibrium 
paradigm is in vogue, which depicts the constant flux in ecosystems 
that has occurred through natural processes over millions of years. 
Nature needs an intermediate level of ecological disturbance so as 
to produce the highest levels of heterogeneity of conditions and life 
forms. Constant flux in nature through a diversity of ecological 
processes must be respected as nature’s way of allowing life on 
earth to flourish. Again, the conclusion is that humans should let 
nature take its course. 
Both paradigms require minimum human intervention in natural 
processes at any level. The fact that humans do not fully understand 
all ecological processes at work, and have so often destroyed or 
disturbed such processes through harmful interference, reinforces 
the idea that nature is better off left to its own devices. Sometimes 
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any kind of human intervention is regarded as harmful human 
control, whilst nature is spelt with a capital N and described as 
almost divine: benevolent (“Nature will do what is good”), omniscient 
(“Nature knows best”), and omnipotent (“Nature can and will sort out 
these difficult problems”). Humans can do no better than allowing 
nature to be free and to develop according to its own dictates.  
The strong version of this argument implies that wildlife managers 
must let nature be and the elephant problem will sort itself out. This 
solution works as follows: Elephants have a robust feeding pattern 
that gradually changes woodland into grassland, destroys the 
habitat of some species and creates conditions for other species to 
flourish, and eventually a population of elephants may even crash 
under severe conditions, because they have depleted their own food 
resources (Owen-Smith, 1988:264). Maybe the population will not 
crash but merely move away to other areas where there is a better 
habitat. Or maybe depleted food resources will bring down 
elephants’ rate of reproduction. Thus elephants will eventually 
relieve pressure on their existing home range as a result of the 
benevolent functioning of natural ecological processes that have 
developed over millions of years. Some scientists place their hopes 
on the advent of trans-frontier parks or the establishment of 
corridors between conservation areas to enhance the feasibility of 
this option, as larger areas become available within which ecological 
processes can operate. 
Proponents of this view believe that drastic changes to the 
environment and its population of living beings caused by the impact 
of elephants are nothing to worry or get excited about. These 
changes are merely highly visible phenomena when viewed in short-
term perspective, but normal natural occurrences when observed as 
part of larger natural cycles spanning time scales of hundreds of 
years (see Buss, 1990:173). The scientific evidence for these 
benevolent natural cycles is mostly rather flimsy, as detailed 
bookkeeping of natural phenomena and events, let alone the 
scientific study of nature, does not go back more than a century or 
so (see Whyte, 2002:295). According to Gillson and Lindsay (2003: 
417) “Most data-sets cover periods of decades, at best, whereas 
many ecological processes take much longer, particularly with 
animals and plants sharing long life-history parameters, such as 
elephants and trees.” To rely on these ideas with short-term, 
inadequate supporting evidence about natural cycles is thus to trust 
speculative ideas which may, or may not, lead to damage to 
landscapes and ecosystems and harm several species of living 
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beings (see Whyte, 2001:301-302; Osborn & Parker, 2003:3). Such 
damage may take centuries to recover, if ever. The ethical issue is 
whether conservation managers should take such high risks of 
losing irreplaceable areas of beautiful natural wilderness forever, 
based on these ideas that are not firmly supported by scientific 
evidence gathered over the longer term. Is it fair to current and 
future human generations, as well as to the diverse species of living 
beings involved to adopt management policies that might lead to 
irreparable damage of conservation areas or cause nonreversible 
harm to wildlife populations?  
Unexpected changes in climate and weather patterns, and the 
impact on food resources are some of the features that humans 
cannot control or always manage efficiently. The comment of 
Sheldrick (1980:88-89) regarding the devastating outcome of a 
severe drought and the attempts of an elephant cow to comfort 
young orphaned elephants serves as an example: 
Droughts have always been and always will be a feature of 
areas of such marginal rainfall such as Tsavo: they are 
something ordained by nature which lies beyond the 
control of man. They may even be necessary in arid lands 
to trim populations of large mammals such as elephants to 
the carrying capacity of the land and permit the large-scale 
regeneration of the nyika’s scrubby bush. Nothing is ever 
static in nature; it swings back and forth like the pendulum 
of a giant clock that gauges time not in tens but in 
hundreds of years … If (the rains) did not come at all or fell 
so intermittently, that the first flush of green withered before 
the plants could cast their seeds, then the elephants, with 
their gigantic appetites and inefficient digestions were the 
first to suffer. But never had they been in such dire straits 
as during those six long, harsh years of the great drought. 
They died in their hundreds. 
During this time of great suffering and sorrow, baby 
elephants were being orphaned nearly every day as 
mothers succumbed to the effects of malnutrition. From 
Eleanor’s large heart flowed the boundless sympathy and 
comfort that an elephant can give in such generous 
measure, and which she lavished on one drought-stricken 
orphan after another whenever they were brought back by 
the Field Force. 
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Unhappily, by the time most of them arrived back they were 
usually already too far gone to be saved, and the shock of 
capture proved fatal, but we, and Eleanor, always did our 
best just the same, and were kept very busy. However, 
when despite our efforts one baby elephant after another 
collapsed and died, Eleanor sorrowed so sorely that we 
became worried about subjecting her to so much mental 
anguish, for she was showing signs of becoming neurotic, 
and even began to lose condition. Quite obviously, she 
came to associate lying down with death, and because of 
this did not like to see any of her charges lying down, even 
for a rest. Dashing over immediately, she would haul them 
back on to their feet to satisfy herself that they were not 
about to die as had so many others recently. 
Consequently, after a while, all her charges began to suffer 
from lack of sleep, going about in a daze like zombies. 
Is it fair to elephants to casually allow their numbers to increase to 
such an extent that a major once-in-a decade-or-two drought will 
trigger a population crash? For an elephant population to crash 
means that large numbers of elephants die of starvation. Some 
elephant lovers would rather see them die of starvation than have 
humans control their numbers through methods like culling. The 
crucial issue is whether elephants dying of starvation over a period 
of weeks and months suffer less than a herd of thirty elephants all 
being shot by a rifle from a helicopter within two or three minutes 
(Chadwick, 1992:431-432). Why is devastating long-term elephant 
suffering ending in a slow, painful death for some, and experiencing 
the painful deaths of kith and kin for others more acceptable than 
almost instantaneous death? This question is very important, as the 
crippling suffering is not only nature’s doing by means of regularly 
occurring droughts. This suffering also results from human inaction 
and omission. If humans interfered in order to ensure that a 
conservation area had enough food available for its inhabitants to 
withstand the kind of drought that occurs only once every fifty years, 
that kind of intense pain and distress would have been avoided for 
large numbers of elephants (see Birkett, 2002:276-282). This point 
needs to be stressed, as culling is never to be viewed on its own, 
but must be judged in contrast to the consequences entailed by its 
alternatives. If the choice is to let nature be, then the long-term 
consequences of such choice must be justifiable as well.  
A policy of environmental laissez faire, of letting nature be, rests on 
a huge mistaken assumption. The assumption is that beneficient 
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natural processes operate at any level, regardless of the size of a 
conservation area. This assumption is incorrect. Some crucial 
natural processes operate at least partly at much larger scales, such 
as global warming and weather systems (El Nino, for example) 
clearly illustrate. To let nature be might have been an appropriate 
environmental policy to protect all living beings on earth during those 
times, centuries ago, when a much smaller human population had 
minimal impact on the earth’s environment and the inhabitants of its 
ecosystems. Those days are long gone. Ever since the discovery of 
fire and the development of technological skills to make weapons, 
humans have had an exponentially increasing impact on the earth’s 
environment and its inhabitants. Humans have been hunters through 
millennia: at times ruthless, destructive hunters that have ex-
terminated a variety of species. The acceleration of our exploitation 
of wildlife throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, our increased 
occupation of land through our rapidly growing numbers, and our 
destruction of the environment through pollution, deforestation and 
global warming are major factors depriving wildlife of its traditional 
safe havens and sanctuaries in unspoilt wilderness areas. 
The effects humans have had on the environment over the last two 
centuries imply that wilderness areas as habitat for wildlife – and 
especially for elephants – have shrunk dramatically. Space for those 
species of wildlife that cannot easily co-exist with humans is not 
available outside many conservation areas anymore. Conservation 
areas have become the safe places, the sanctuaries of wildlife. They 
are indeed artificial human constructions that form small islands of 
wilderness amidst the African lake of human settlements that drive 
elephants and other big game out, as elephants especially compete 
with agricultural activities or endanger human lives (see Chadwick, 
1992:40). Scientists working on the so-called elephant problem 
more often than not do not show sufficient awareness of the 
exponential increase of the human population in Africa over the past 
two centuries, with the associated diminishing size of land available 
for wildlife. The extent to which natural ecological processes have 
been curtailed, constrained, and diminished by human beings over 
the last hundred years still awaits detailed investigation and 
explanation. Whether we can still speak of “natural processes” in 
Africa’s small areas of land available for conservation is a decisive 
factor in debates about elephants, but a factor as yet poorly 
understood. 
As human constructions, conservation areas have fences to 
delineate their boundaries. These fences can consist of wire, electric 
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cables, or human settlements. Elephants leave a territory when 
human density exceeds 16 humans per square kilometer (Du Toit, 
2002:1412). Conservation areas are thus heavily influenced by 
human settlements surrounding them, even in some of the 
supposedly most natural conservation areas without any fences, like 
Chobe National Park in northern Botswana (see Cumming & 
Cumming, 2003:566). Some rivers running through conservation 
areas are used, abused, and polluted by humans where those rivers 
flow through their agricultural land or urban areas before these rivers 
enter conservation areas (Whyte, 2001:9). Cattle come in contact 
with animals like buffalo and transmit diseases like bovine TB that 
spread through some wildlife populations like wildfire. Humans 
spread exotic plant material that rivers, birds, or winds carry into 
wilderness areas where those plants might choke vulnerable, 
endangered indigenous species. Conservation areas in Africa are 
thus invariably influenced by human beings to a greater or lesser 
extent – the issue that needs to be addressed is to what extent 
humans are detrimentally influencing the natural ecological 
processes in a specific conservation area.  
Why and how had these artificial human constructions, called 
conservation areas or game reserves, been created? In Africa, most 
of these conservation areas were initially created to protect 
wilderness areas and to safeguard species of African wildlife from 
extinction. Hunting by so-called great white (European) hunters led 
to the extinction of some species, like the Cape quagga. In 
proclaiming these conservation areas, governments removed the 
human settlements in those areas. In most cases these people had 
been living in those areas for centuries, where they made a living 
that had minimal impact on the environment. Whilst in most cases 
they hunted wildlife for food, they did so in ways that kept wildlife 
populations in check rather than decimating the hunted game like 
the European hunters did in the colonies their governments ruled by 
force.  
Once these indigenous people were removed from conservation 
areas, mostly without compensation, a new kind of human presence 
invaded these wilderness areas. The people in charge of con-
servation areas and providing services to tourists live permanently in 
conservation areas. A constant flow of tourists in motor vehicles has 
established yet another kind of human presence. Contemporary 
conservation areas are not pristine wilderness areas without human 
presence. Motor vehicles need roads. Roads provide easier routes 
for large animals than struggling through the sometimes dense 
790   Koers 70(4) 2005:775-813 
H.P.P. (Hennie) Lötter 
African bush. Dust roads interfere in nature as the dust collects on 
plants, especially grass, alongside the road. Tarred roads are 
slippery for some larger mammals, making such roads favourite 
hunting grounds for some lions. 
The important point is that conservation areas are not part of vast 
open expanses on the African continent where no humans, or only 
small groups of humans with low environmental impact, occur. 
Conservation areas are surrounded by human settlements and 
closed off from the wider areas and open spaces that were available 
in earlier times. If the public is given access to conservation areas, 
as invariably happens, game reserves are significantly interfered 
with through the high-impact presence of humans caused by their 
vehicles and their consumption of food and water. The infrastructure 
required for vehicles (roads and fuel) and consumption (shops, 
refuse removal, water and sewerage systems) have a significant 
impact on wilderness areas. The result of all these different kinds of 
interference on a local and regional scale is that some larger scale 
ecological processes do not operate as we suspect they did two or 
more centuries ago. If we do not intervene to correct unacceptable 
human influences that disturb nature’s processes, we will merely be 
condoning human intervention and interference that occur anyway.  
There seems to be some kind of inverse proportional relationship at 
work regarding the need for human intervention in conservation 
areas. There is a greater chance of a more complete package of 
natural ecological processes still operative that requires little or no 
human intervention the larger the conservation area and its 
associated semi-wilderness neighbouring areas are. In smaller 
conservation areas less natural ecological processes might be at 
work requiring more human intervention. With zoo enclosures, for 
instance, elephants require human interference at almost impossibly 
high levels to provide elephants with any kind of “natural life.” 
Although this inverse proportionality is merely speculative, it serves 
to illustrate the point that human occupation of land formerly 
available for wildlife in Africa has created massive challenges to 
manage conservation areas in ways that keep natural ecological 
processes optimally intact. 
Should we condone the irresponsibility of some humans that led to 
exotic plants invading conservation areas? And should we allow 
those plants to squash the indigenous plants that host many insects 
and birds? Should veterinarians do nothing when cattle diseases 
carried by imported cattle from Europe are transferred to buffalo at 
boundary fences and eventually threaten to wipe out the lion 
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population of the Kruger National Park, for example? Does the idea 
that nature must take its course in this case dictate that nothing 
needs to be done? I doubt that. To let nature take its course rather 
implies doing research to develop vaccines so as to get rid of such 
diseases and to find solutions to get rid of exotic, problematic plants 
that have been imported from other continents by irresponsible 
humans. In such cases human intervention keeps nature on track. 
Intervention corrects the follies and mistakes humans make that can 
upset delicate ecosystems that nature lovers want to observe 
functioning as they functioned millions of years ago. 
Can this justification of intervention also be applied to the 
management of elephants? Nobody really knows how elephant 
numbers were kept in check by nature when humans only had a 
minimal impact on their environment (Scmidtz & Willott, 2002:16). 
We do know that many human communities in Africa and Asia 
hunted elephants, as humans hunted mammoths and mastodons 
virtually to extinction in North America, Europe, and Asia (see 
Owen-Smith, 1988:296). Whether elephants died of starvation 
during droughts, whether they migrated to areas with no elephants, 
whether they suffered from disease or predation, nobody really 
knows (Sukumar, 2003:374; Owen-Smith1988:2). These phe-
nomena imply that if we choose to intervene, we must find 
information and justification for such intervention from sources other 
than a romanticised past. 
Conclusion 2: 
Humans have already massively interfered with nature and 
must take responsibility for this interference. We thus ought to 
interfere responsibly to conserve wilderness areas for future 
generations in as natural a state as possible. Malevolent human 
interference in nature has become so prevalent that humans 
must now interfere benevolently so as to “let nature be”. The 
aim is to protect and conserve nature’s workings in the earth’s 
biosphere through all the various ecosystems. This aim implies 
that environmental ethics must give priority to a holistic 
approach to the conservation of the earth’s biosphere and its 
constituent elements. 
2.2 “Animals have rights and thus no elephant may be 
interfered with”  
Many of the harshest critics of human interference in the lives of 
elephants, especially by means of culling, are referred to as animal-
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rights activists or animal-welfare activists. Do animals really have 
rights that humans must respect at all times? If so, who have 
assigned them their rights and why should humans refrain from 
violating these rights? Or should we perhaps argue that all sentient 
beings have interests that humans ought to respect to the degree 
that those beings can experience welfare, i.e. pleasure and 
satisfaction or pain and distress? If the interests and rights of 
individual animals have to be taken into account, should these 
interests and rights get priority above the well-being of ecosystems 
and species? 
2.2.1 Regan’s deontological individualism 
Tom Regan (1983) is regarded as champion of the idea that animals 
have rights which humans must respect (see also Cohen & Regan, 
2001). Regan’s uncompromising stance is that many living beings 
are similar to humans as they possess mental capacities and can 
experience their lives in terms of better or worse welfare. Such 
animals are subjects-of-a-life and they thus have inherent value. 
Thus, animals must be treated respectfully as rights-holders that 
have the same moral status as humans. Respectful treatment 
implies that such beings may not be killed, their bodies may not be 
invaded or injured, and their choices may not be restricted nor their 
freedom limited. Regan strongly rejects all utilitarian positions as 
such views cannot protect innocent individual animals from being 
sacrificed for the benefit of others whose interests count more (see 
Sagoff, 2002:42). Regan emphatically rejects the killing of any 
rights-holder and strengthens his position by saying that killing is 
unacceptable regardless of the consequences for others.  
When he discusses wildlife, Regan often states his view simply as 
“let them be!” (Regan, 1983:357, 361). He refuses to see wildlife as 
a natural resource available for human benefit and recommends that 
wildlife managers should aim to keep “human predators out of their 
affairs” (Regan, 1983:357). I doubt whether Regan’s views on 
animal rights can be applied so simply to conservation dilemmas. He 
touches on such issues briefly, but does not highlight the full 
implications of his view that all individual animals have rights that 
need almost absolute protection. Applied to the issue of controlling 
elephant numbers, one can usefully extend his views by taking a 
cue from his discussion of what is ethically acceptable when a rabid 
dog attacks you in your backyard (Regan, 1983:296). Although he 
reiterates his position that animals can do no moral wrong, in this 
case the dog is a threat to our bodily integrity and maybe even our 
life. We can thus defend ourselves and harm the dog in the process 
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(Regan, 1983:296). What Regan does here is to weigh the rights of 
humans, whom the dog might violate, against the rights of the dog 
as aggressor that intends bodily harm to a fellow animal (the 
human). The rights of the victim thus trump the rights of the 
aggressor through legitimate self-defense.  
Let us assume for the sake of argument that Regan’s view on 
animal rights is generally accepted as true and correct. If individual 
elephants have rights and so too millions of individual insects, 
reptiles, birds, mammals, and amphibians qualify as rights-holders, 
how are we going to solve the ensuing complex conflict of rights 
when elephants destroy the habitat and thus endanger the livelihood 
of millions of other rights-holders? (see Cumming & Cumming, 
2003:561). Animals cannot manage and administer their own rights 
under the best of circumstances, thus needing humans to assist 
them. If humans have to solve this problem in terms of animal rights, 
then we should interfere in this conflict of rights to life. Or could an 
animal-rights supporter be so callous and insensitive to say that 
millions of living beings can be allowed to die in the name of “letting 
nature be”, but not one animal may die as food for humans or in 
service of medical research to save humans (and animals) from 
devastating illness and disease? Perhaps culling elephants with the 
explicit motive of removing excess numbers to protect the habitat for 
millions of living beings seems more in line with an animal-rights 
approach than merely letting nature be? 
2.2.2 Singer’s consequentialist individualism 
Peter Singer offers an alternative justification for placing the 
interests of animals much higher on our human list of priorities. 
Singer makes the apparently controversial claim that humans have 
no special place in nature and cannot claim any superior position to 
any other animal in any process of ethical decision making. This 
strong claim is qualified by other aspects of his theory (Singer, 
1985:6). Singer counts all beings as morally relevant and able to 
experience pain and distress or enjoy things and have pleasure. His 
view acknowledges that taking a human life can be worse than 
killing a snake. The reasons are that humans have more complex 
and sophisticated experiences of pain and pleasure and humans 
have more complex mental lives that include pasts and futures 
(Singer, 1985:9). Thus, humans’ interests weigh more and count for 
more than the interests of a snake, for example. Humans suffer 
more intensely than snakes. If suffering can be measured in units, 
one could thus say that humans experience more units of suffering 
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than snakes and therefore the suffering of an individual human will 
outweigh the suffering of one individual snake by far. 
In a National Geographic documentary, “Giants of Etosha,” the 
following story is told.  
Ginger Mauney has observed how a matriarch called 
Knobnose has lost two calves in quick succession through 
anthrax. Knobnose was devastated. She left the herd and 
wandered aimlessly for several weeks. Ginger has never 
heard of a matriarch leaving her herd and saw this as an 
indication of the depth of her pain. When Knobnose later 
rejoined the herd, Ginger saw that she remained isolated in 
her grief. When Ginger next saw the herd, Doughnut was 
the new matriarch leading them. 
At a large gathering of elephant herds at a waterhole, 
hundreds of elephants were milling around. Only 
Knobhouse and her herd acknowledge the bones of a 
small elephant lying there. This spot is a gravesite of one of 
Knobnose’s calves. Knobnose and her herd engage in 
what seems a silent ritual of mourning. Listening to tapes 
afterwards, Ginger hears the elephants’ private language of 
grief conducted in infrasound during this moving ceremony. 
When the other elephants move away, it is clear that the 
time of mourning was too short for Knobnose. She lingers 
and whispers to the bones once more. Again Doughnut is 
the one leading the herd away. 
When the herd re-appears in central Etosha after migrating 
towards the north for a few months, Knobnose leads them. 
She looks strong and re-assured and has a newborn calf 
with her. 
If Singer’s intuitively plausible views are applied to the elephant 
problem, the interests of an individual elephant will outweigh the 
interests of most other individual animals belonging to species other 
than homo sapiens. Elephants would have a moral standing lower 
than humans, but higher than most other animals. Some reasons for 
this view include the following. Elephants have a remarkable inner 
life and emotions. These highly intelligent animals with strong social 
bonds exhibit a wide range of emotions. The way they deal with 
death by means of covering carcasses and smelling the carcasses, 
as well as ongoing mourning, is moving (Payne, 2003:82, 83). 
However, despite the moral standing of individual elephants and 
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their species, Singer does not intend his utilitarian ethics to be 
applied in individualistic fashion. When a conservation area has an 
overpopulation of elephants that are destroying the habitat of other 
species and themselves, a careful weighing of the interests of 
different forms of life has to be done. The issue is to determine the 
effect that the consequences of different decisions will have for all 
parties involved. The interests of all individual elephants, millions of 
other living beings, tourists, wildlife managers, and all other stake-
holders must be weighed against one another. I am doubtful 
whether Singer’s utilitarian ethics that treats animals as equals will 
recommend that no interference is the only justifiable option. There 
are too many other animals that might lose their lives and, in some 
cases, even whole species might be wiped off that part of the face of 
the earth. Singer’s utilitarianism would definitely require some kind 
of intervention in favour of the millions of animals with threatened 
livelihoods. Some kind of management intervention, such as culling, 
translocation, or contraception will be justified if all interests are fairly 
added up.  
Although the rights-based and interest-based ethics presented by 
Regan and Singer were not specifically developed as conservation 
ethics, their views alert us to the moral responsibility humans have 
to treat individual animals humanely. Furthermore, we must combine 
Regan and Singer’s insights with those produced by elephant 
researchers like Ian Douglas-Hamilton, Cynthia Moss (1988 & 
1992), Joyce Pool and Katy Payne (1998). These researchers use 
social scientific methods akin to participant observation originally 
developed in anthropology. Regan and Singer urge us to take note 
of the wonder of elephants as agents and these elephant 
researchers enable us to do just that. 
Elephant researchers have convincingly demonstrated that 
individual elephants are agents, sources of self-originating activities 
(Taylor, 2002:89). They have sophisticated bodily processes that are 
capable of transforming atoms and molecules into highly complex 
living structures that form a living, sentient being, with an instinct 
and capacity for survival. Elephants have senses similar to human 
beings: their eyesight might be worse than ours, but their sense of 
hearing and sense of smell are far better than what we possess. 
They can experience a range of emotions, of which playfulness and 
“being silly” in particular amuse us, their mourning the loss of family 
and friends moves us, and their gentle loving care for their young 
endears them to us (see Moss 1988 & 1992). Elephants are 
majestic creatures that inspire awe for their huge size and enormous 
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strength. They engender our sympathy and love for those qualities 
that made ascriptions such as “intelligent” and “gentle giants” true. 
As humans, we have to treat them according to these special 
qualities, which make them so similar to us. 
Anyone who doubts that an elephant can be a subject-of-a-life and 
can exhibit the most amazing characteristics similar to those of 
human beings, must read the story of Ely, as told by Cynthia Moss 
and her research associates (Moss, 1992:64-74). This elephant calf, 
Ely, was born with stiff carpal joints, that caused him to walk on his 
knees, as it were. Moss thought he was going to die, but through 
what Moss and her associates describe as “the calf’s gallant 
struggles” and his “display of sheer determination and guts”, the calf 
managed to teach himself to walk properly. Through the many hours 
of his struggle, his mother and sister calmly and gently assisted him. 
In the words of one of the research associates: 
One scene stays vividly in my mind. The threesome were 
heading towards us through the picturesque palms of Ol Tukai 
Orok. As the two older elephants walked, they continually 
turned to look back at the calf which was shuffling along behind. 
Every few feet they stopped and waited for him to catch up 
before moving on. Their progress was very slow, but they did 
not show any signs of impatience with the calf. It was a 
poignant sight and highlighted the incredible, caring nature of 
these animals (Moss, 1992:72). 
Having pointed to the similarities between humans and elephants 
that create special bonds, we should not ignore the enormous 
differences between the two species. Although elephants can 
destroy us through their enormous physical power in any one-on-
one fight, humans are the dominating species that control so much 
of the lives of elephants. Perhaps the most important difference 
between the two species is the fact that elephants cannot call a 
meeting and discuss the problems their feeding habits create for 
other species. They cannot come up with a plan to deal 
appropriately with such an issue. We must do it for them. Elephants 
do not have our highly sophisticated communication skills, including 
natural and symbolic languages. They do not have our strong moral 
sense, nor our amazing organisational capacities. Elephants cannot 
transform natural resources into useful products such as computers 
like we can, and their impact on their environment is dwarfed by our 
impact. Our capacities for suffering and mourning the loss of our 
dead manifest in far more complex ways than similar capacities do 
in elephant society. The interests of elephants cannot have the 
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same weight as those of humans, as our complexities in terms of 
features we define as relevant to moral standing far outstrip theirs. 
Elephants are also not the only animals with special characteristics 
that we judge to be amazing, although they might be one of the most 
special non-human beings on earth. Many animal species have 
special characteristics that we value or admire, or qualities that 
make them unique, appreciable, and astounding. For example, we 
prize owls for eyesight in the dark, their sharp hearing, and their 
stealth flying. We are amazed by the navigational skills of pigeons 
and marine turtles. Dogs are highly valued animals for their acute 
sense of smell, their ability to be trained for specialist functions to 
assist the police, emergency services, and disabled people, their 
sensitivity to human emotions, and their companionship coupled 
with immense loyalty. We admire and fear lions for their regal 
demeanour, strength, ferociousness, and their hunting prowess. The 
differences in the complexity of mental life between humans and 
elephants are perhaps much more than the differences between 
elephants and owls, dogs, or lions. There seems to be no convincing 
reason why elephants should deserve a moral status similar to 
humans, as they are much closer to other animals than to humans. 
They do, however, deserve a special moral status within the animal 
kingdom, as they have some of the most complex sets of behaviour 
and intricate inner lives of all animals. 
Conclusion 3: 
Elephants are very special animals (mammals) that deserve 
treatment with respect. They are, however, not rights-bearers at 
the same level as human beings and they are not necessarily 
deserving much more respect than dogs or lions. Although we 
must take Singer’s consequentialist individualist environmental 
ethics seriously, the interests of individual animals cannot 
outweigh our concern for the ecosystems and biodiversity of the 
earth’s biosphere. 
2.3 “Ban human utilisation of conservation areas”  
Opponents of human interference to control elephant populations 
often associate culling with the commercial use and exploitation of 
wilderness areas and the wildlife they contain. They surely have 
reason to think so – the culling operations in the Kruger National 
Park (1967-1994) and at Luangwa in Zambia (1967-1969) both had 
abattoirs that processed meat, hides, and ivory for commercial 
purposes (see Hanks, 1979). Opponents of this practice find the 
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idea abhorrent that conservation must pay its way through utilising 
natural resources by means of regular harvesting of wildlife (Hanks, 
1979:165). Whether harvesting takes place by means of culling 
excess animals or issuing hunting licenses, the whole idea of a 
conservation area conforming to the economic logic of cattle 
ranching, seems repulsive (Ginsberg, 2002:1185; Du Toit, 2002: 
1403-1416). The reasons behind this feeling against utilisation are 
that human interests stand paramount in determining the value of 
wildlife, with the implication that whatever humans do not find 
valuable, can be neglected, abandoned, or wasted. People against 
this kind of harvesting, or sustainable utilisation of wildlife resources, 
try to articulate an intrinsic value for conservation areas, assigning 
value to them that is independent of human concerns and interests.  
Can conservation areas escape being used by human beings? In a 
sense that is impossible. Conservation areas and game reserves 
exist as open spaces dedicated to some form of conservation by the 
grace of human beings, mostly through the institutions of 
governments. Conservation areas and game reserves proclaimed as 
wilderness areas, national parks or provincial reserves, or private 
game reserves and game farms, exist and operate within the 
framework of a political system and its associated constitution and 
laws. They are often proclaimed in terms of specific laws. 
Governments have environmental agencies and bureaucracies 
charged with the management, development, and extension of such 
areas. To have conservation areas properly managed and 
protected, to increase the number of habitats, landscapes, and 
ecosystems to be preserved, and to ensure appropriate con-
servation policies, require political action to lobby, pressurise, and 
influence governmental policy makers. To do so successfully, 
conservation areas and game reserves must be of some use to the 
citizens of a country and concerned, interested parties from 
elsewhere as well (Regenstein, 1985:132).  
2.3.1 The goal and purpose of conservation areas 
What is the goal and purpose of conservation areas? I want to argue 
that the conservation of natural world diversity should be the broad, 
overarching goal of the conservation of wilderness areas in any 
country. The concept biodiversity is commonly used to refer to the 
goal of conservation (see Holmes Rolston III, 2002:38). Although 
biodiversity is often employed with wider meanings than the mere 
conservation of life (bio-) forms (Whyte, Biggs, Gaylard, & Braack, 
1999:113), I prefer the term natural world diversity which can more 
easily include all forms of life, as well as landscapes, places of 
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geological interest, ecological processes, water systems, eco-
systems, and so on.  
Conservation in national parks and wilderness areas should be 
comprehensive, with the goal to protect the full scope of natural 
world diversities. This approach implies that all aspects of con-
servation areas should be protected so as to allow and enable 
nature to function, as far as possible, on its own without human 
interference or even without benevolent human intervention. These 
special conservation areas are to be treated as the heritage of the 
citizens of the world and should be sanctuaries where humans do 
not kill and destroy any kind of life. Conservation areas in Africa 
should exhibit the beauty and magnificence of the African wilderness 
as it has developed and changed throughout the centuries. These 
areas should have limited human presence and even less human 
interference, so as to allow natural ecological processes to function 
as they did for millennia. These places should be free from all forms 
of human domination, exploitation, and oppression. 
Such conservation areas provide opportunities to establish different 
“biocentric” or “ecocentric” “worlds” where natural world diversity 
flourishes and free animals pursue their interests as they see fit 
within their preferred habitats. Such “worlds” can allow evolutionary 
processes to follow their slow, mysterious ways. Ecotourists should 
behave like visitors and guests who show deep respect for the 
“citizens” of these “worlds.” They should know and appreciate the 
fact that no conservation area is either a cattle ranch or a zoo. In 
these areas nature must follow its course and human interests must 
be subservient to the dictates of the wilderness. Ecotourists in these 
“worlds” can imagine themselves entering past worlds, worlds 
similar to the ones in which humans first evolved thousands of years 
ago and akin to those in which our early hunter-gatherer ancestors 
survived for millennia. 
2.3.2 Four arguments for the conservation of natural world 
diversity 
Why should politicians be convinced that this idea of the con-
servation of natural world diversity would best serve the interests of 
their electorate? I want to present four arguments for the con-
servation of natural world diversity.  
The arguments for the conservation of natural world diversity appeal 
to two ideas. One idea is that conservation areas can have multiple 
uses. The other idea is that conservation areas can induce complex 
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and diverse human experiences in different individuals involved in a 
variety of activities. 
2.3.2.1 The deep appreciation argument 
I want to call the first argument for the conservation of natural world 
diversity, the deep appreciation argument. The manifestation of the 
diversity of the natural world brings us into contact with events and 
phenomena that are so much more than us, and which have been in 
existence and in the making for millions of years before we arrived 
as latecomers on planet earth, in terms of an evolutionary time-
scale. The diversity of the natural world confronts us with an 
awareness that we cannot create anything remotely similar, despite 
the scientific and technological brilliance of our species. The natural 
world overwhelms us by showing us life-forms more sophisticated in 
some ways than us, and thus we are left in awe of its wonders. Aldo 
Leopold (1981) best articulates this sense of wonder, reverence, 
and amazement in his wonderful book, A sand county almanac. It 
makes sense that so many visitors to conservation areas have 
experiences of awe, wonder, and amazement. These experiences 
provide special ways of recreation and relaxation that give new 
perspectives on the nature and role of our species on earth.  
Experiencing the amazing diversities of the natural world can also 
be humbling. In these conservation areas we get a faint inkling of 
the dangers and threats with which our ancestors lived. Without 
access to the tools created by our enormous scientific and 
technological capacities and skills, individual humans cannot roam 
around self-confidently in conservation areas as masters of the 
earth. Many living beings can kill or maim us if we move around in 
their territories without the usual human tools for protection 
(Chadwick, 1992:93). We often need to be reminded of our human 
vulnerability so as to experience ourselves as part and partner of the 
biotic community on earth. A situation as depicted below can 
perhaps illustrate our dependence on helping aids in appreciating 
nature: 
‘Where is the tape and microphone, Wolfgang? I can hear 
the Southern Boubou calling!’  
‘I don’t know Lilly, we last used it to tape the Heuglin’s 
Robin. Maybe it is next to the digital camera, or perhaps in 
the video camera’s bag.’  
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‘OK, Wolfgang, I have found it. Now I can record the 
Southern Boubou’s call!’  
‘I will check all the details of the Boubou on the laptop’s 
Robert’s programme while you are recording.’  
‘Wolfgang, before you do so, please take our book of trees 
and check whether the Boubou is sitting in a star chestnut.’  
‘OK, I’ll do so if I can find the book amongst the mammal, 
reptile, and butterfly books! You better start recording or 
your Boubou will fly away. In the meantime I’ll also 
reorganise our books and equipment!’” 
2.3.2.2 The interests of the current generation 
The value of the diversity of the natural world can also be argued by 
appealing to the interests of the current generation. To have such 
special experiences in conservation areas, citizens must have 
access to them. Not every citizen gets an opportunity to visit a prime 
national park regularly or even once in their lifetime, due to factors 
such as cost, availability, accessibility, and low income. Everyone 
alive now should have an opportunity to visit such places and 
experience nature in this special way, which reconnects us with our 
evolutionary history. For this reason citizens have a vested interest 
in ecotourism. Tourists typically want to see the charismatic mega-
fauna (the big five and their associates), but they also want to 
observe the splendours of the rich diversity of the natural world of 
the African savannah. This diversity includes big and small 
mammals, plants, insects, birds, reptiles, amphibians, landscapes, 
scenic beauty, and majestic trees that are much older than humans. 
Tourists ought not to be deprived of observing and experiencing 
forests and woodlands in prime condition. They long to see this 
complex, comprehensive package at its winter’s or summer's best. 
Perhaps not all tourists want to see all species, but they at least 
want to see their collection of favourites and know that the 
prerequisites for the survival and flourishing of these species are 
maintained in tact.  
I find it particularly noteworthy that very few people champion the 
case of plants in the debate about the so-called elephant problem. 
For so many participants in this debate, plants can be destroyed at 
will by elephants, because supposedly plants can regenerate in a 
century or two. I find this attitude towards plants problematic. It 
might be that grasses and shrubs can regenerate in a relatively 
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short period of time, but some trees take decades and even 
centuries to reach their prime. The trees of the African savanna can 
be enormously spectacular. Ian J. Whyte is one conservationist 
clearly aware of the value of trees in relation to the value of 
elephants. He (Whyte, 2002: 299) says 
… to stand under the canopy of a massive old baobab tree and 
to ponder a little on the age of such old giants, is an emotional 
experience of a different kind, but one which in its own way is 
no less soul stirring than that which may be gained from 
elephants. It is perhaps also their size which makes the initial 
impression, but the aura of age is tangible. 
He also acknowledges baobabs as a “keystone species” in the light 
of their significant role in creating living space and survival 
opportunities for many other living beings (Whyte, 2002:299). For 
reasons like these, woodlands in prime condition need to be 
conserved as an example of what such woodlands can be like 
without severe utilisation caused by an overpopulation of large 
herbivores. The interests of elephants should not totally outweigh 
the beauty and value of the amazing variety of woodland species 
(Regenstein, 1985:130). 
I honestly doubt that any tourist wants to see the starvation and 
horrific suffering of thousands of animals during a drought that 
results from human decisions that allowed large numbers of wildlife 
to deplete food resources. I also doubt that tourists want to observe 
devastated woodlands with the skeletal remains of once magnificent 
trees, which results from those same decisions. Such decisions 
have the consequence that wildlife runs out of food during serious 
droughts and thus destroys woodlands. If starvation happens during 
a once in lifetime drought (occurring once every fifty to hundred 
years) it might be understandable. If severe mass suffering of 
animals through starvation, however, occurs during a once-in-a-
decade drought, it will be far less acceptable. Furthermore, tourists 
do not want to feel threatened by any animals and feel unsafe in 
their cars. Aggressive elephants that dominate a conservation area 
through large numbers might pose serious threats. Tourists thus 
have an interest in preventing elephants from being made 
aggressive through trophy hunting or indiscriminate, badly planned 
culling.  
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Conclusion 4:  
We cannot ignore the interests of tourists, some of whom might 
only get one or two opportunities in a lifetime to experience the 
wonders of African wilderness areas at their best. For this 
reason conservation areas should be managed with the utmost 
care to portray natural world diversity at its best. Humans have 
strong interests in the conservation of both ecosystems and 
wilderness areas that portray part of our evolutionary history. 
2.3.2.3 The interests of future generations 
Future generations in three hundred years’ time could expect that 
we have conserved the diversity of the natural world for them to 
enjoy, just as we can now be legitimately angry with previous 
generations for hunting certain species to extinction. The future-
generations argument states that people in many different futures 
must have similar opportunities to ours to experience, observe, 
witness, and enjoy the world as it once consisted of a variety of 
wilderness areas, of which very few examples are now left. Once 
such areas are lost, they are gone forever. Most of the areas that 
remain today consist of extremely fragile landscapes that have not 
yet been dominated and affected by human interference or 
intervention. They consist of different “packages” of natural world 
diversities. Although fragile, in decades after destruction these 
landscapes are sometimes quite robust in terms of possibilities for 
long-term regeneration. However, this capacity for regeneration 
varies and some ecosystems (like forests) do not recover after 
destruction (Owen-Smith, 1988:279). Many conservation areas are 
priceless in terms of scenic beauty, but many are extremely 
vulnerable to the destructive potential of human power.  
2.3.2.4 The pragmatic argument 
There is a pragmatic argument that, in combination with the other 
arguments, supports the overall value that conservation areas have 
for political decision makers and their electorate. The pragmatic 
argument consists of two parts, based on the benefits we know 
conservation areas can have for us and those yet unknown benefits. 
Anyone familiar with the natural sciences knows that we do not fully 
understand the nature, functions, and workings of all aspects of the 
natural world. To neglect or destroy aspects of the amazing 
diversities of the natural world implies an arrogance to make and 
implement decisions about things we do not fully know and 
understand. Furthermore, allowing species to become extinct 
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deprives future generations of opportunities to independently 
experience, observe, study, and understand aspects of the natural 
world based on what will be their vastly superior base of 
accumulated knowledge, bequeathed in part by us to them. So we 
have to protect all diversities of the natural world, even those ones 
we think we know and understand completely. Only then do we 
leave future generations the option of learning about certain life 
forms, phenomena, and events for the first time, or to revise what 
might prove to be our inaccurate or incomplete knowledge.  
Man’s intervention in nature and the killing or removing of one 
animal from its habitat have manifold consequences not always 
realised by us. The following incident illustrates that we do not 
always understand and calculate the outcome of every act of 
interference in the animal world: 
Joshua senses that something is wrong with the truck. Its 
huge size makes it difficult to maneuver the vehicle through 
the small mountain pass near Hoedspruit. The huge bull 
elephant that has been captured earlier the morning in the 
KNP weighs more than seven tons. The elephant does not 
help Joshua at all – the bull constantly moves around from 
one side to the other. At the sharpest turn near the bottom 
of the pass the movement of the elephant is suddenly just 
too much for the truck. Joshua clings frantically to the 
steering wheel, but the truck runs off the road and crashes 
into a ditch. Involuntarily Joshua thinks: fortunately I was 
driving slowly; fortunately I did not sustain any injuries. His 
first concern is the elephant – Joshua gets out of the 
vehicle and inspects the elephant through the viewing 
holes in the truck. Oh dear, he thinks, the elephant is hurt. 
Fortunately the veterinarian in charge of the capture has 
just arrived on the scene. The vet is very upset about the 
injury and possible loss of a trophy bull. Immediately he 
tries to diagnose how serious the elephant has been hurt. 
In the meantime, a crowd of locals have gathered around 
the truck. They start singing with joy: they might have a 
feast tonight if this elephant dies! 
No one can argue that we are clueless about the benefits some 
species of African wildlife can produce for humans. For thousands of 
years humans have roamed the plains and mountains of Africa in 
search for food among Africa’s fauna and flora. No one really knows 
how big the impact of human hunting was on African wildlife, 
elephants included. What can be said for sure is that the impact was 
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minimal and the use of African fauna as a food source was 
sustainable. If not, we would not have had reports from early 
European explorers describing Africa as a place “teeming with 
wildlife”.  
The advent of conservation areas and game reserves has stopped 
the descendants of these traditional Africans from engaging in 
traditional cultural practices to ensure their survival. They were 
removed from newly proclaimed conservation areas, excluded from 
their erstwhile hunting grounds, and those who crossed the 
boundaries to hunt as their ancestors did were – and are still – 
persecuted as “poachers.” Have these people been fairly treated? 
Their voices and concerns are not often heard and their case mostly 
appears as a few notes in the margins of the debates about the 
management of elephants. Perhaps their unfair treatment and the 
neglect of their interests are part of their unwillingness to support 
conservation. These people often legitimately regard conservation 
areas as their former homelands that provided them with livelihoods. 
They judge that colonial or independent governments have unjustly 
deprived them of access and ownership of these areas. Now these 
areas are playgrounds for the rich from which the people who 
ensured the survival of African wildlife over centuries through 
sustainable use derive no benefit. Many of these people living in 
poor communities around conservation areas – and hosts of their kin 
in urban areas – have become estranged from conservation efforts. 
Many conservationists judge that overcoming this estrangement is 
crucial for the long-term success of conservation in Africa (Weladji & 
Tchamba, 2003:73; Buss, 1990:176). 
African wildlife has been a major resource in the struggle for human 
survival on the African continent for centuries. Can it be used as a 
sustainable resource for fighting desperate human poverty in African 
countries? (Osborn & Parker, 2003:73; Du Toit, 2002:1403-1416). 
Will it be ethically acceptable to use conservation areas not only for 
the purposes of ecotourism broadly described above, but also for 
hunting, culling, harvesting excess wildlife, thus, in short, for 
commercial exploitation? Several projects in different African 
countries have shown the idea to be viable if managed carefully 
(Bonner, 2002:320-329). The idea also makes sense, as many 
African savannah areas are by far more suitable for wildlife farming, 
than for cattle ranching or cash crops. If implemented on a large 
scale, much more land will become available for African wildlife, as 
has happened in South Africa’s explosive development of 
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commercial conservation for the purposes of ecotourism and sport 
hunting (Bulte & Horan, 2003:110).  
Many concerned wildlife enthusiasts immediately reject such 
proposals for sustainable use as ethically unacceptable. However, 
one must be careful not to reject such an idea out of hand. Most 
democratic societies experience reasonable moral pluralism, which 
means that over a range of issues, reasonable and morally mature 
adults make conflicting moral judgments on the same issue. 
Humans in democracies have learned to live with such deep moral 
differences about serious matters, such as abortion, by being 
tolerant towards one another and acknowledging that there are no 
universally applicable moral principles for some moral dilemmas 
(Willott & Schmidtz, 2002:xx). Of course, there are certain funda-
mental moral values embodied in a society’s conception of justice, 
such as the injunction not to kill fellow citizens. But even the detailed 
understanding and application of such moral values do not 
necessarily rest on full consensus, as can be seen in controversies 
about whether the right to life can be squared with the death penalty. 
Thus, if we live in a human world where we have reasonable 
differences about serious moral issues (see Gutmann & Thompson, 
1996), then can those of us whose personal morality does not allow 
hunting, rejects eating the carcasses of wildlife, and disapproves of 
animals being killed for human purposes, have a right to legislate for 
those of a different opinion? (see Schmidtz, 1997:327-329). 
One must note that a vast majority of people accept the use of 
cattle, sheep, and pigs as excellent nutrition for human beings. I am 
not aware of any particular reasons why these commercially used 
animals should have much less of a moral status than most species 
of African wildlife. This state of affairs implies that rejecting 
commercial use of African wildlife as a sustainable natural resource 
for Africans to better their lives might be labelled as a case of 
cultural-ethical imperialism. Do rich, privileged environmental 
activists – who can afford a healthy vegetarian diet (or neatly 
packaged meat from a supermarket) – have the right to impose their 
cultural and personal ethical views about deeply controversial moral 
issues of hunting and eating meat on poor rural peasants with 
centuries-old traditions of sustainable use of wildlife?  
Many Westerners and Africans of European origin cannot claim that 
their ancestors have a history of utilising African, American or 
European wildlife in similarly sustainable ways. European and 
American histories on many continents testify to their unsustainable 
practices: they have hunted many species of wildlife to extinction on 
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their own continents (Gröning, 1999:444) and Europeans almost did 
the same in colonies on the African continent through large-scale 
slaughter of African wildlife by the great white hunters of the 19th 
and 20th centuries (Hanks, 1979:14). Thus, the credibility of these 
people is low in terms of their own history of wildlife utilisation and 
also because these nations are still major consumers of the meat of 
domestic animals. Nelson Mandela rightly said that the issues of 
culling and natural resource utilisation in Africa are ones that 
Africans will have to resolve for themselves, whilst still taking into 
account stakeholders on the African continent and further afield 
(Mandela, 1995:24-25). 
If one takes the claims of people who have lived with African wildlife 
for centuries seriously, then the idea of a morally pluralist world 
opens the possibility for legitimate use of elephants through culling 
and hunting. I do, however, believe there might be good moral 
arguments that restrict both these options. 
Conclusion 5: 
We cannot ignore the interests of people living next to wildlife 
sanctuaries; nor their traditional lifestyles, the history of their 
neglect by many successive governments, or their exploitation 
through the expropriation of their land for conservation 
purposes. The legitimacy of conservation purposes and efforts 
can be established partly through benefiting the people most 
closely affected by conservation in their daily lives, those who 
often bear the cost of conservation by living in fear of African 
wildlife crossing boundaries to raid their crops, kill their cattle, or 
harass and kill them or their kin. Whether these benefits come 
through ecotourism, hunting, or through culling must be decided 
in the light of local circumstances and specific cultural values. 
3. Do we have a case for human intervention in 
elephant lives in conservation areas?  
In this article I have tried to establish arguments to justify careful and 
caring human intervention in conservation areas, which might 
include managing large numbers of elephants that are judged to be 
overpopulated. The argument consists of the following parts: 
• We ought to intervene responsibly 
Humans have already massively interfered with nature and must 
take responsibility for this interference; therefore we ought to 
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intervene responsibly to conserve wilderness areas in as natural a 
state as possible for future generations. Malevolent human 
interference in nature has become so prevalent that humans must 
now intervene benevolently so as to “let nature be”. Human 
intervention can be justified in terms of a fundamental commitment 
to respect the earth’s biosphere and the natural ecological 
processes it contains. Limited management interventions in 
conservation areas thus should aim to reverse or neutralise any kind 
of human interference that obstructs, limits, or disables natural 
ecological processes. This commitment leads to a holistic environ-
mental ethics that gives priority to the conservation of all factors that 
make life possible on earth. 
• Humans have a moral responsibility to treat individual 
animals humanely 
Animals ought to be treated as agents that possess inner lives of 
greater or lesser complexity. Though they have different levels of 
moral standing, they should be treated with respect to preserve their 
lives. Human interference in nature often leads to conflicts of 
interests between different kinds and numbers of individual animals. 
The elephant problem is a prime example. In such cases humans 
must intervene in a fair way to promote the diversity of the natural 
world, and the interests of all living beings should appropriately be 
weighed. Humans have a moral responsibility to treat individual 
animals humanely.  
This commitment justifies an individualist consequentialist 
environmental ethics that alerts people to their responsibility to treat 
animals with respect, as so many animals have amazing mental 
lives and unquestionable capacities to experience pain and 
suffering. Elephants deserve a special moral status within the animal 
kingdom, as they have some of the most complex sets of behaviour 
and intricate inner lives of all animals. We have to treat them 
according to these special qualities, which make them so similar to 
us. Elephants as the largest land animals are very special mammals 
that deserve to be treated with respect. 
• The interests of elephants cannot have the same weight as 
those of humans 
There seems to be no convincing reason why elephants should 
deserve a moral status similar to humans, as they are much closer 
to other animals than to humans. The interests of elephants cannot 
have the same weight as those of humans, as our complexities in 
terms of features we define as relevant to moral standing far outstrip 
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theirs. They are not rights-bearers at the same level as human 
beings. Although elephants possibly deserve one of the highest 
moral standings amongst non-human beings, they do not 
necessarily deserve much more respect than dolphins, dogs, or 
lions. Elephants are thus not the only animals with special 
characteristics that we humans judge to be amazing, but they are 
some of the most special non-human beings on earth. 
• “Human beings responsibly first, then the interests of other 
higher beings a close second” 
If we assign the highest moral standing by far to human beings, then 
we must say, “Human beings responsibly first, then the interests of 
other higher beings a close second.” We cannot ignore the interests 
of people living next to wildlife sanctuaries; nor their traditional 
lifestyles, the history of their neglect by many successive 
governments, or their exploitation through the expropriation of their 
land for conservation purposes. We can also not ignore the 
injustices committed against people who were removed from land so 
as to establish conservation areas. 
• Be tolerant towards others with reasonable differences about 
moral issues 
The legitimacy of conservation purposes and efforts can be 
established partly through benefiting the people most closely 
affected by conservation in their daily lives, those who often bear the 
cost of conservation by living in fear of African wildlife crossing 
boundaries to raid their crops, kill their cattle, or harass and kill their 
kith and kin. Whether such benefits come through ecotourism, 
hunting, or through culling must be decided in the light of local 
circumstances and specific cultural values. Although many con-
cerned wildlife enthusiasts will immediately reject such proposals as 
ethically unacceptable, they need to be tolerant towards others with 
whom they have reasonable moral differences about serious moral 
issues, such as hunting animals, eating the carcasses of wildlife, 
and killing wildlife for human purposes. 
• Conserve natural world diversity  
The conservation of natural world diversity should be the broad, 
overarching goal of the conservation of wilderness areas in any 
country. These areas should be available to citizens to provide them 
with experiences of awe and amazement at the wonders of pristine 
African wilderness areas at their best. Everyone alive now should 
have an opportunity to visit such places and to observe the 
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splendour of the rich diversities of the natural world of the African 
mountains, plains, and savannah that reconnect us with our 
evolutionary history.  
• People in many different futures must have opportunities 
similar to ours 
Not only people alive now should have these opportunities, but 
people in many different futures must have opportunities similar to 
ours to experience, observe, witness, and enjoy the world as it once 
consisted of a variety of pristine, wilderness areas, of which very few 
examples are left. Future generations should also not be deprived of 
opportunities to independently experience, observe, study, and 
understand aspects of the natural world diversities based on what 
will be their vastly superior base of accumulated knowledge, 
bequeathed in part by us to them.  
• We do not yet fully understand all aspects of the natural 
world 
There is no doubt that we do not yet fully understand the nature, 
functions, and workings of all aspects of the natural world. To 
neglect or destroy aspects of the amazing diversities of the natural 
world implies an arrogance to make and implement decisions about 
things we do not fully know and understand. 
If humans may indeed legitimately intervene in conservation areas 
to let nature be, to protect the lives of all the diverse individual 
animals under their care, and to conserve the amazing diversities of 
the natural word, then the management of elephants is legitimate as 
part of the conservation of natural world diversities. How to 
determine whether management options available for dealing with 
an overpopulation of elephants are ethical, is the topic of another 
essay. 
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